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Abstract We investigate the basic principles of structural
knowledge. Structural knowledge underlies cognition, and it
organizes, selects and assignsmeaning to information. It is the
result of evolutionary, cultural and developmental processes.
Because of its own constraints, it needs to discover and exploit
regularities and thereby achieve a complexity reduction.
Keywords Knowledge  Information  Representation 
Gestalt  Structural knowledge  Self-reference
Introduction
The question of knowledge has been one of the guiding
themes of the intellectual life of Olaf Breidbach. The
systematic questions are
1. What is knowledge?
2. What can we know?
3. Where does knowledge come from?
He approaches these questions from many different, but
interwoven perspectives:
• Epistemology/philosophy
• Theory of science
• Evolution
• Neurobiology
• Simulations in artificial neural networks
• History of science
• History of culture and art
• Media theory, analysis and conception of collections
and exhibitions.
He devotes many publications and several monographs to
this topic, such as Breidbach (2001, 2005, 2008), Breid-
bach and Vercellone (2011) and in particular Breidbach
(2011), with his striking thesis that self-reassurance,
becoming certain of one’s position, is only possible
through the insight that one is the result of a contingent,
autonomously evolving, historical process. In order to
ground your knowledge, you need to realize not only that it
depends on a contingent historical path, but also understand
how such a process can create knowledge. This is the only
way out of the inner perspective to which both a cultural
tradition or the brain of a beetle are confined.
Of course, we should first clarify what we mean by
knowledge. We are not concerned here with factual
knowledge, with knowledge about the truth of propositions.
That is a classical philosophical topic; a recent contribution
to the old debate is, for instance, Williamson (2000) where
many of the classical arguments are discussed and often
refuted. The issue is whether knowledge can be defined as
something like justified true belief, in which case the
notion of belief would be prior to that of knowledge. But
this is not our concern. We are not interested in direct
knowledge about isolated facts; in fact, it is not even clear
whether the concept of an isolated fact is even meaningful,
and for instance, Quine (1953) has argued that the empir-
ical content of an individual statement is not a meaningful
concept. In this essay, we shall reach similar conclusions,
from a different perspective and combining tools from the
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formal sciences with insights gained from neurobiology
and cognitive psychology, and therefore perhaps better
supported than a merely philosophical approach.
Instead of factual, declarative knowledge, we are rather
interested in structural knowledge, that is, in schemes for
the organization of clusters of data that can guide inter-
actions with the outside world. For instance, when we ask
what the beetle’s brain knows about the world, a first
answer might be that it ‘‘knows’’ how to behave in specific
situations. But even this answer cannot really be correct.
Insects have evolved as couplings of very general effectors
with rather specific actuators. This means that one and the
same general control mechanism can trigger a wide range
of specific actions, according to body segment, insect
species, developmental stage, or caste in social insects (see
for instance Breidbach and Kutsch 1990). Of course, this is
very different from human procedural knowledge, or from
the cultural traditions of a society. Nevertheless, we can
ask whether there are any general principles underlying or
governing these diverse manifestations of knowledge.
This essay is an expanded and adapted version of the
English translation of a text that I had written many years ago
to be published in a volumeonknowledge thatOlafBreidbach
had planned to edit. It is the result of an intellectual exchange
spanning several decades. It draws upon such fields as the
theory of information, statistics and learning theory, or the
mathematical theory of dynamical systems, which are com-
plementary to the fields mentioned above, but it reaches
conclusions that are quite compatible with what Olaf Breid-
bach had found from his perspectives. It seems therefore most
appropriate to dedicate this essay to his memory.
Knowledge as representation
What can we know? This question is very naive, and we
shall expose its naivete´. Nevertheless, it is instructive to
turn to it in detail, starting in a negative manner by
determining what we cannot know. There is a lot that we
cannot know: we cannot predict the lottery numbers for
next week, and often not even the weather. There exists a
standard explanation: such phenomena are based on so-
called chaotic dynamics, i.e., those in which small differ-
ences in the initial conditions grow exponentially over
time. So according to this explanation, the problem is that
we cannot determine the initial states with absolute preci-
sion. But why not? If we could go down to the molecular
level, or the nuclear, perhaps even the subatomic one, we
should be able to gain the required precision. However,
then the required effort will become immense, and this can,
in fact, be captured in a more principled and basic way.
But let us proceed with our example for a while. We can
know the weather of the last week, because we may
remember it or because someone has recorded it. But how
is it with the weather in Leipzig, or more precisely in the
swamps in the lowlands of Elster and Pleiße on 10/08/
1016? (Where we suppress the fact that there has a calendar
reform between now and then, and so, the correspondence
between the dates is more complicated.) There exist no
sufficiently precise documents, and the backward compu-
tation faces similar problems as the forecast of the future.
But why then do physicists believe that they can recon-
struct the first 3 min1 of the universe, that is, the situation
immediately after the Big Bang more than 10 billion years
ago? And if we already have great difficulty with the
weather next week, why then are the predictions of climate
scientists for global warming over the next decades at all
credible?
In order to analyze the problem in a more fundamental
manner, we look at a different type of example, the cellular
automata introduced by John von Neumann and Stanislas
Ulam, see Von Neumann and Burks (1967).2 In the sim-
plest variant, one has a chain of elements which for each
discrete point in time, n ¼ 0; 1; 2; 3; . . ., can assume one of
two possible values, 0 or 1, off or on, black or white—the
semantics is arbitrary. Which of these two values an ele-
ment takes at time n is calculated according to a fixed rule
from its own value and those of its neighbors at time n 1.
One specifies some initial values at time 0 and then lets the
dynamics run on its own as described. The dynamical rule
is completely deterministic, and we can therefore ask
whether from the knowledge of the initial values, we can
know the state of the elements at a given later time, for
example, n ¼ 1000. Of course, we can simply let the sys-
tem run and then observe what happened after 1000 steps.
But the question is whether this is really necessary, or
whether we can compute the answer directly from the
initial values and the deterministic iteration rule. For some
rules, this is trivially possible, for example, when the rule
simply always assigns the value 0. It is much more inter-
esting, however, that there are rules for cellular automata,
in which there is no shorter or easier way to obtain the
result after 1000 steps, than to let the dynamics operate
itself for 1000 steps. The complexity of the system is thus
not reducible. In our weather example, this would mean
that there is no easier way to determine the weather for the
next week than to watch the weather for 1 week. We
cannot know the future in advance. Laplace was just sim-
ply too naive.
The situation seems to be even worse: if in quantum
chemistry or molecular biology, one wants to compute the
1 So the title of a popular science book of physicist Weinberg (1993).
2 For details, see for instance Jost (2005), 8.1, and the references
given there. Instructive computer simulations of cellular automata can
be found at http://www.ddlab.com.
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three-dimensional shape of some molecule, such as a large
protein, one often has to run a huge supercomputer for
hours or even days, and sometimes still this does not even
deliver the correct result. The underlying equations are so
complicated or have so many degrees of freedom that such
an enormous computational effort cannot be avoided. The
computation of the system, in this case of a simple mole-
cule, is many orders of magnitude more complex than the
simple observation. Why is that? Among other things,
despite all the impressive miniaturization achievements of
semiconductor technology, the computer is still operating
on a much coarser scale than the molecular or atomic one,
which is that of the object in question. By now there are at
least theoretical designs for quantum computers, operating
at a scale that is even smaller than that of the molecule.
And modern physics believes, according to superstring
theory, to have identified the fundamental, no longer
resolvable constituents of matter, which are many orders of
magnitude smaller than the known elementary particles
such as protons or electrons. If one were able to also
compute at this most fundamental level, the computation
would have overtaken the reality again. But then we would
have still the problem that the computation would not be
easier than the reality. Why would it be worth then to
compute at all? The answer lies in a different direction.
With the supercomputer, we do not compute or simulate a
protein because we are interested in this specific protein as
an individual object, but because all proteins with the same
building blocks behave also similarly. There are physical
laws and therefore regularities. So we only once have to
compute and then know the result for all such proteins.
That is the basis of our knowledge. Knowledge is based on
the knowledge of laws and regularities, and thus it requires
a regular world. This was known3 already to Leibniz and
Kant, but it is reassuring that this insight has not been
overturned by modern physics.
The Heisenberg uncertainty principle of quantum phy-
sics teaches us that an accurate prediction of all details of
atomic processes is fundamentally impossible. But the
Schro¨dinger equation incorporates a deterministic behavior
of probability amplitudes. So while the classical behavioral
of the quantum mechanical variables is not deterministic,
but stochastic, conversely stochastic variables evolve
according to deterministic rules.
But it gets even better: in most physical processes, or
abstractly, in most dynamical systems there are only few
relevant degrees of freedom, while all other degrees of
freedom exponentially approach a state of equilibrium or
average out, and then no longer influence the dynamical
evolution. It can be shown mathematically that this
behavior is typical of dynamical systems,4 see for instance
Jost (2005). So we need to know even less than all the
details of the initial conditions in order to predict the global
behavior of the system. Where the cannonball strikes,
depends only on few macroscopic variables, and we do not
need to know the exact details of the internal molecular
configuration or even the subatomic particles inside the
ball. Apart from certain relativistic corrections, the trajec-
tories of the planets around the sun follow the laws dis-
covered by Kepler and the rules of Newtonian point
mechanics. Thus, objects that are internally as complex
structured as the planets can be treated as extensionless
mass points for their celestial motion. Although the
weather apparently behaves really chaotically, the under-
lying chaotic attractor has a particular dimension, which is
substantially lower than the number of available degrees of
freedom. While this does not allow for a concrete accurate
prediction of all the details, it nevertheless constrains the
possible dynamical evolution. In addition, on a larger time
scale random fluctuations and chaotic perturbations aver-
age out, and this may perhaps allow for long-term climate
predictions. This averaging of random fluctuations is
incidentally also crucial for the transition from the
stochastic behavior of the atomic quantum world to the
deterministic dynamics of macroscopic processes. An even
more significant confinement of the details of a finer scale
takes place in the constitution of the atomic world from its
elementary building blocks, and the latter can be isolated,
if at all, only with enormous experimental effort in gigantic
particle accelerators and colliders.
We have thus dealt with the physical and ontological
aspects. In this sense, knowledge is possible because the
world is regular and the dynamical behavior of macro-
scopic objects is typically determined by a few parameters.
We need to insert an important caveat here: such simple
regularities as the laws of Kepler of planetary motion are
the exception rather than the rule, as argued in Jost
(2015b). At both smaller and larger scales, the physics gets
much more complicated. And more generally, if the world
were so simple that we could completely understand it, it
would not be rich and complex enough to support our
existence as physically quite complex beings.
Nevertheless, for our present purposes, the fact that at
some scales, however rare and exceptional they may be,
such simple regularities hold, is what makes predictions
possible and therefore, as we are arguing here, can ground
knowledge.
Thus, the present conclusion is that knowledge can
represent the regularities of the outside world. But does the
representation of a regularity not already presuppose a
3 That knowledge about knowledge is possible will also guide some
of our subsequent considerations. 4 This is also the basis of Haken (1990).
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regular structure? Or, putting it another way, how is this
knowledge then represented in turn? That is our topic.
Information and knowledge
How do we gain knowledge? We interact with the outside
world and with our fellow human beings, receive signals,
inputs, messages. From this we need to build our knowl-
edge. To understand this, we must first investigate what
insights we can gain from a message and what internal
conditions are needed for this. This leads us to the subject
of this paper.
Shannon quantified the information of a message by its
novelty for the receiver, how much it contributes to the
reduction of the latter’s uncertainty Shannon and Weaver
(1949). The information contained in a message is the
greater, the more unexpected it is for the receiver. In this
way it could be quantified which amount of information
can be transmitted without interference by a given channel.
A prerequisite of this approach is that a code between
sender and receiver is arranged in which the message is
written. In this approach, the meaning of the message does
not need to be considered. In particular, in principle
everything can be reduced theoretically to the simplest
possible code, the binary one. A message is thus a sequence
of 0s and 1s, and the receiver expects different such strings
s with different probabilities p(s), and the average negative
logarithm of these probabilities, that is, the entropy of the
ensemble of possible messages, becomes the Shannon




pðsÞ log2 pðsÞ ð1Þ
(where the base 2 logarithm is taken, so that when one of
two equally probable alternatives, i.e., pðiÞ ¼ 1=2 for
i ¼ 1; 2, is observed, the information gain is 1 bit). This
proved to be an extremely fruitful approach to under-
standing and optimizing the transmission of information,
but the situation underlying Shannon’s theory is obviously
not without assumptions. How does the receiver know the
code of the sender? Had this code also been transmitted via
the shared channel, and which other code had then be used
for this transmission? This reduction obviously would not
work. And how does the receiver know the probability
distribution for the ensemble of possible messages? Prob-
ably from an empirical frequency distribution of already
received messages. But this would move the question only
into the past, instead of answering it.
Shannon’s theory is not concerned with the information
as such, but with its transmission in a not further ques-
tioned context. Therefore, it focuses on the channel.
However, our questions are aimed at the receiver and
therefore cannot be answered within this theory. Their
further analysis will lead us to the concept of knowledge.
Because for these questions, the channel is not essential,
the sender will also lose its specific role. The sender will
only come back into view when it comes to strategies of
influencing the receiver. But the latter, the receiver, has to
be constituted, that is, it must be ensured that this agent
will respond to the message at all, and this will in turn be
expected only when he/she attaches a meaning to this
message. So we ask what makes the information to an
information for the receiver. And why does this informa-
tion interest her/him? And is he/she interested at all in any
information received? Is not some sequence of 0s and 1s, or
some message written in some other code, not simply a
random string without any discernible significance for the
receiver, some noise that he/she no longer perceives, but
rather ignores?
These questions suggest that we have to proceed dif-
ferently for our purposes. If we want to understand the
receiver, we cannot separate information and meaning. We
have to start with the assumption that the system that we
want to consider as the receiver of a message can perceive
a certain difference. This means that its receptors or sen-
sors can distinguish at least two different states of its
external world. Such a perceived difference then becomes
relevant for the system when those possible states have
different consequences for the system, or, as Bateson
(1972) put it succinctly, ‘‘a difference that makes a dif-
ference’’. This can be expressed in a different response of
the system, but it is sufficient if different internal states of
the system arise. These states need not be visible to the
outside world. A (perceived) difference causes a difference
(in or for the system). Conversely, the difference is only
perceived because it has a consequence for the system.
Otherwise it would be ignored, disregarded. The specific
reaction must have an advantage for the system over the
indifference.
For this, while not unconditional, but simple situation,
there are now two major extensions. The first takes us to
the theory of signs (see for instance Keller 1995) and
semiotics (e.g., Eco 2002). The perceived difference need
not be directly relevant to the system, but can be a sign,
that is, represent a different distinction. Following Peirce’s
classification, the system can, instead of directly perceiving
the raindrops, interpret a dark cloud as a symptom of the
expected rain, a notched circular gray spot with parallel
slashes in the weather forecast as an icon5 or the verbal
communication ‘‘It will rain’’ as a linguistic symbol. It can
then anticipate the rain by a causal, associative or rule-
based inference according to the type of sign received.




The meaning of the sign consists then, as already stated,
in its effect on the receiver. In particular, this distinction
between the various types of signs and inference schemes
does not matter. We can thus also bring the sender back
into the picture if it just produces the signal for the purpose
of influencing the receiver. The difference caused by or
resulting from the perceived difference in, by or for the
receiver then needs to make a difference for the sender.
Extending Bateson’s slogan, we could speak of a difference
that makes a difference that makes a difference.
This is no longer so easy, and in particular not without
assumptions and preconditions. We turn therefore to the
second extension of the basic situation described. The
receiving system is no tabula rasa, not a primitive stimulus-
response mechanism, but it possesses an internal structure
and is shaped by the information already received in the
past. However, this aspect must be further refined. First, a
temporal factor comes into play. The received character
may perhaps only point to a relevant difference in the
future. The flowering shrub will bear fruit in a few weeks,
and it is useful to remember it then. This requires a
memory which can store information and make it currently
available. Thus, the system must be able to bridge a time
difference. This stored information is the simplest form of
knowledge. Although the information has novelty value for
the system, it does not lead directly to an external reaction,
but first creates a different internal state of the system. The
question of the storage medium will be postponed. In any
case, this represents only the simplest form of memory. In
the next stage, the memory can be used to compare a
current stimulus, a signal, a message to another one already
received in the past. Thus, the system builds its own
internal reference system. What is new can then be set in
relationship to what is already known. The system can thus
also detect differences between differences, i.e., notice that
a new stimulus differs from the previously received ones.
So the system is gaining not only the information from the
current stimulus, but also information about the statistical
distribution of stimuli. So one of the issues raised seems to
be easily solvable. It is important that now a stimulus
contains information on various levels, first about what can
be extracted from it via causal, associative or rule-based
inference, secondly, on a longer time scale about an
ensemble of stimuli. This can of course be iterated to gain
more, higher levels. One aspect of this is that this current
stimulus needs to be recognized as a member of an
ensemble. Thus, it has to confirm expectations of the sys-
tem at a higher level. At the same time, on a more ele-
mentary level it has to have some novelty value and
therefore must carry information, and so should not be fully
expected, but should have an element of surprise. Of
course, this balance between expectation confirmation and
surprise shifts in the course of system development. This
occurs on one hand through the fact that the new stimulus
may affect and modify the distribution of the stimulus
ensemble, and on the other hand by the described devel-
opment of higher levels of organization. Knowledge is not
only produced, but also structured. We therefore consider
knowledge as stored and structured and thus available
information.
The information is received and ‘‘evaluated’’, thus loses
its value, which consisted precisely in its novelty. In con-
trast, the knowledge gains value by the potential contained
in it for a future application and as a reference for new
information that can only acquire their value by the very
fact that the structure of knowledge gives them internal
meaning.
Generation of knowledge
Now two aspects have been mixed, which have to be
separated again. This becomes clear if we undertake it to
assess or evaluate that knowledge, as we did with the
information by its novelty value.6 Knowledge was intro-
duced as stored information about the outside world and in
that capacity, it was also assessable as information. We
thus measure to what extent uncertainty about the state of
the outside world is reduced by that knowledge. This also
leads to a problem that is, however, only indicated here.
The quantification of information or knowledge by an
entropy says nothing about the value of knowledge for the
respective system.7 In any event, knowledge as a collection
of data about the outside world constitutes a complexity
gain for the system. This gain consists in the fact that for
the system, the complexity of the outside world is reduced
by enabling it to make certain aspects of the outside world
reproducible as regular (see Jost 2004 for a systematic
analysis).
It is more important for our purposes, however, that the
production of knowledge is not a passive storage process,
but an active structuring process. The efficiency of the
6 For a more detailed treatment of some aspects of the sequel, see Jost
(2004).
7 This is somewhat analogous to a discussion in economic theory, the
concept of the price as labor value vs. market balance between supply
and demand. In the economic context, the value of information can be
measured by the price that the receiver is willing to pay for the receipt
of this information Arrow (1971). The value of the information thus
does not lie in the difficulty of obtaining it or in its content expressible
in bits, but in benefits for the receiver as reflected in the price that can
be obtained. The monetary code in this respect is better adaptable than
the information-theoretic bit code to the total internal state of the
receiver; the latter takes into account only the current state of
knowledge of the receiver and measures its increase through the
information. For a systematic treatment in the context of game theory,
see Bertschinger et al. (2015).
Theory Biosci.
123
patterning is then expressed at a given data collection by a
complexity reduction. Conversely, such complexity
reduction through increased efficiency of structuring data
then in turn sets capacity free for an extension of the
amount of data, that is, an increase in complexity. This
interplay can be expressed only when we distinguish
between external and internal complexity, as in Jost (2004).
We will now analyze this active structuring process in
more detail, particularly in the context of human cognition.
This is about discovering and exploiting regularities in the
data obtained. Before we examine this more closely,
however, it must be pointed out that this in no way rep-
resents a first-principles situation. What an (e.g., sensory)
datum is, will only be determined by the internal structure
of the system, in the context of which it can get assigned
meaning, usually on the basis of specific observations
selected by internal hypotheses (see Jost 2004).
This aspect of the feedback, that the internal structures
and hypotheses determine what is singled out and per-
ceived from the abundance of sensory stimuli and how this
develops into percepts, is probably the most important one
for the understanding of cognition. Nevertheless, we want
to first investigate the supposedly simpler direction, namely
the creation and adaptation of internal models from
observations. After the failure of most rule-based models
from AI, artificial intelligence, for orientation in situations
that are not precisely circumscribed and detectable, the
theoretical approach has shifted (among many references,
see for instance Pfeifer and Scheier 1999; Ay et al. 2012 or
the collection of essays in Engel et al. 2015).8 The diffi-
culty that the AI research could not overcome was to for-
malize the respective required context or background
information and to incorporate it into logical chains. Even
in situations where this contextual knowledge simply
consists of a fixed set of simple rules, high performance
could be achieved only through the use of extremely high
computing capacity, as in chess, without being able to
reproduce the intuitive position sense of human players. In
Go, the problem was that purely rule-based circuit chains
apparently are not able to develop global long-term
strategies within which local positions can be evaluated.
Therefore, the computer programs remained hopelessly
inferior to good human players, until recently a deep neural
architecture that gained expertise by playing against itself
could beat the world champion (Silver et al. 2016). Formal
rule-based methods are completely overwhelmed in real
environments, whose context is too complex in principle
for being completely representable within the system. This
becomes already clear from basic system theoretical
considerations, see Jost (2004). More recent approaches
therefore are no longer rule-based models expressed in
terms of formal logic, but rather explore different types of
statistical learning and inference or try to replace the
deductive sequential reasoning by recurrent association
dynamics. We lose the certainty that arises from the formal
correctness of a chain of logical conclusions, but will gain
the chance to get a usable and generalizable model. But this
paradigm shift does not simply consist in replacing one
class of strategies for solving a given problem by another,
but the problem as such is also shifted fundamentally.
Although we have already indicated and will come back to
the fact that this does not yet yield a really adequate for-
mulation of the problem of cognition, we shall briefly
discuss those approaches because they provide some useful
insights for understanding the origin of knowledge.
The starting point is that precisely what is assumed
without question in the Shannon information theory,
namely, the statistical distribution p of possible input sig-
nals, has to be reconstructed, or at least estimated, from a
limited, and therefore incomplete, and possibly noisy or
otherwise perturbed collection of already received signals.
Thus, because the data set is incomplete and the capacity of
the system is limited and the internal structure of the sys-
tem is not arbitrarily flexible and adaptable, the system can
only achieve some estimate q of this distribution. When the
system receives now another signal i, it contains the sub-
jective information
 log qðiÞ; ð2Þ
while the information with regard to the distribution p is
 log pðiÞ: ð3Þ
But since the signals are not yet known before they are
received, the expected information gain resulting from the
observation of a new signal is obtained by averaging these
expressions over the probabilities of the individual signals.
Although a rarer signal yields a larger gain of information,
such a signal is observed less often. Therefore before one
receives the signal, nevertheless one may still not expect a
large gain in information, because with higher probability
one has to expect that some more frequent signal occurs
which then provides less new information. The expected
subjective information gain then is

X
pðiÞ log qðiÞ; ð4Þ
while the actual expected information gain from the dis-
tribution p is the Shannon information (1)

X
pðiÞ log pðiÞ: ð5Þ
When p and q are different, that is, when the subjective
estimate is different from the actual distribution, the latter is
8 Important lessons can be learned here from the insight of Von
Uexku¨ll (2014); for a formal approach in this direction, see for
instance Ay and Lo¨hr (2015).
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smaller than the former. Rather than being happy about the
supposedly higher information gain due to the subjective
hypothesis, the receiver should rather use the received sig-
nals to adapt its subjective distribution q and perhaps reduce
the difference to the actual distribution p. In other situations,
the receiver might want to obtain the best possible estimate
q for the unknown p from a certain class of distributions. In
general, the receiving system will not be able to model an
arbitrary distribution, but its internal structure will restrict a
priori the possible models. If the available class of models is
fixed and the only issue is to determine the free parameters in
this class so that the best possible q results, we are in the area
of parametric statistics, an established and well studied
mathematical theory.9 If the selection of themodel class is an
issue, e.g., to avoid overfitting, an over-adaptation to the
signals previously received and their contingencies, one is
lead to the field of statistical learning theory (Vapnik
1995, 1998). A fundamental result of this theory is that in
order to obtain reliable error estimates, the number of
received signals must be asymptotically larger than the
number of degrees of freedom in the model.10 However, of
course the number of degrees of freedom should not be too
small either, in order to have a sufficiently large number of
models available to capture the data fairly accurately. In the
context of cognition, these principles are explored in Jost
(2016). It may also happen that the received signals do not
accurately follow the distribution p that one is searching for,
but that they are perturbed or distorted by noise or other
undesired effects. This too can be treated, in principle, within
the framework of mathematical theories, but will not be
pursued here.
Instead, we need to start a little deeper and face the fact
that what we have taken as externally given data or signals,
in essential respects are the results of constructions by the
receiving system—which, incidentally, also makes the
expression ‘‘receive’’ itself somewhat questionable.11 For a
system, there are no information as such, no raw data, no
input, but these result only from the insertion into an
internally developed system of category structure. Cate-
gories allow the system specific and targeted observations.
In this sense, information is generated as something
important or relevant only by the receiving system. What
does not fit into the category structure is not perceived by
the system. What is without structure for the system, is
random, is noise, and therefore automatically ignored. Only
the categories allow the system to make distinctions.
Thereby, a received signal becomes a carrier of informa-
tion by reducing the uncertainty concerning specific mea-
surements dictated by some category. However, the
expected information depends not only on the category, but
on the distribution p of the signals with respect to the
categories. This distribution is not fully known to the
system, but, as explained, the system can model it on the
basis of the received signals by a hypothesis q and adjust
this hypothesis continuously on the basis of the newly
acquired signals. However, not only q but also the category
system can be adapted and changed. An important differ-
ence from what we have said previously is, incidentally,
that the probability distribution p is no longer independent
of the receiving and observing system datum, but also
depends on the category structure of the system (for a
simple example, see Jost et al. 1997; this will be further
analyzed in Jost 2017b).
The modeling by probability distributions p still falls
short even despite this point, because the signals typically
do not follow an independent distribution but have certain
correlations, transition probabilities. Therefore, instead of a
distribution p of signals, we should rather consider a
stochastic process X.
The extraction of information means reducing uncer-
tainty for the system. This uncertainty, however, can be
reduced not only by observing the signal process X, but
also by the identification of regularities in the process.
Such regularities on one hand allow a compression of the
data already collected for the purpose of efficient storage,
and on the other hand they also provide a basis for pre-
dictions about future signals, i.e., a reduction of uncer-
tainty, without these signals having to be actually received.
Here, of course, it is assumed that the process X is sta-
tionary, that is, its statistical characteristics do not change
over time.
Now comes an important point: regularities can only be
found if a need for compression exists, as otherwise the
received data can be reproduced in a completely faithful
manner. A rule consists precisely in the best possible rep-
resentation of the data under fixed constraints, i.e., internal
restrictions. For such a selection to be made among the
available options for the internal representation, the num-
ber of degrees of freedom has to be bounded, or, more
9 The competing Bayesian approach to statistics is based on prior
probabilities for each model and adjusts them based on the
probabilities with which the models postulate the received signals.
The conceptual and decisive problem that decides about the success in
a concrete situation is whether or in a specific situation how well one
can construct those prior probabilities. The current trend in many
disciplines favors the Bayesian over the parametric approach. The
Bayesian scheme is computationally more expensive than parametric
statistics, because entire probability distributions have to be computed
instead of single parameters, but the ever increasing available
computer power makes this less relevant.
10 As measured by the Vapnik–Chervonenkis dimension.
11 This also has quite problematic aspects. If knowledge is no longer
‘‘objective’’, but a subjective adjustment placing data in an internal
dynamic process, that is, when knowledge is only constructed by the
interpretative performance of the subject, the objectivity of observer
testimonies or historical and other sources becomes questionable. See
Fried (2012) for an analysis of this issue, and for an instructive case
study, see Fried (2003).
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precisely, there have to be fewer degrees of freedom than
observations. Otherwise the need for compression is
eliminated, and also what is contingent and follows no rule
is shown in the data, if the data should be recorded as
faithfully as possible. We are thus lead back under a new
aspect to the central point of the statistical learning theory
of Vapnik–Chervonenkis. In abstract terms, the finiteness
and limitations of the cognitive system are a prerequisite
for being able to make predictions with nontrivial content.
(However, no system can fully grasp its environment by its
own rules, since the latter as the more comprehensive
system is necessarily more complex in terms of statistical
physics. Because the system itself is part of its environ-
ment, in any case, we have to face the mathematical and
philosophical problem of re-integration, self-reference.)
But the foregoing still underestimates the active com-
ponent in the development of knowledge. To get this better
into our view, we notice that the category of which we have
spoken as a classification scheme for input signals is still a
rather arbitrary formal principle. According to what criteria
are categories formed, what determines the assignment of
an input pattern to a category? Are categories rigid struc-
tures like drawers, into which inputs are sorted, or do they
develop only through concrete experiences? In what sense
there are general categories, are they not just collective
labels for groups of exemplars? Or should we rather
replace the diffuse and possibly abstract concept of a cat-
egory with the more contentful one of the prototype? We
are asking here for the organizational principles of
knowledge, and we want, in particular, also cover the
dynamical aspect inherent in this issue. In order to gain
insight here, we analyze the concept of a gestalt. This term
was introduced by von Ehrenfels (1980) as a psychological
concept. With this term, he tried to explain the holistic
identification of higher units, and important criteria for a
gestalt were that it is more than the sum of its parts and that
it is not altered by transpositions. Von Ehrenfels invoked
here the example of a melody. We shall not discuss further
the development of this concept as an organizing principle
for perceptions, as a functional whole in the history of
psychology. From the viewpoint of formal logic, a gestalt
was conceived as an invariant under transpositions of a
complex, or complementarily but equivalently, as an
equivalence class under correspondences.12 This now
clarifies the term formally and specifically reduces a gestalt
to internal relations, but it still leaves open how the
respective transpositions, correspondences, equivalences
emerge and are selected. If there are no rules for this, a
gestalt still remains a rather arbitrary ordering principle.
This problem was solved in a joint work with Breidbach
and Jost (2006). We took the transformation rules as a
mathematical structure which the receiving system, which
now becomes a perceiving subject, actively applies to its
received input patterns. A gestalt consists therefore in the
common characteristics of a set of patterns that can be
mutually converted by transformations of a given type into
one another, or in mathematical terms, as an equivalence
class of the operation of a group of transformations, the
invariance group of the gestalt. The new and crucial
ingredient here is the formal structure of a group. A group
is in this case within the meaning of mathematics under-
stood as strictly here is a mathematically defined term; the
main properties are that the elements of a group can be
composed with one another and also be inverted, reversed,
and that this operation is associative, that is,
AðBCÞ ¼ ðABÞC, i.e., it does not matter whether we com-
pose A with the result of the combination of B and C, or the
combination of A and B with C. The order of the compo-
sition, however, in general makes a difference, i.e., AB may
be different from BA. An illustrative example is the gestalt
of a circle, which is independent of the location and size of
a particular circle, so for the purposes of group theory, it is
invariant under shifts and scalings. It is important that the
groups that typically occur are finitely generated and pre-
sented, that is, they are already fully determined by the
specification of finitely many elements and composition
rules. Thus, we have a universal structure whose concrete
realization is already determined by a finite number of
parameters. We have thus obtained a general formal prin-
ciple, with which a system can structure the input data of
any kind for itself. In abstract terms, the set of transfor-
mation rules in turn follows general internal rules. These
rules allow the system to reconstruct all the transformations
that determine the gestalt from a few transformations
between concrete available samples or prototypes. Of
course, this can also be generalized by employing other
algebraic structures. This is for instance important for the
formal transformation grammar in linguistics. In any case,
this approach will allow us—or the system we are con-
sidering—to generate a gestalt from a set of patterns that
have certain similarities by a transformation group gener-
ated from those similarities. We only need to find trans-
formations which convert the patterns into one another, and
take those as the generating elements of a transformation
group. The resulting gestalt will then contain even more,
new pattern, namely all those that arise from the applica-
tion by the group elements on the initial patterns. The
gestalt of a circle can therefore be generated by specifying
2 or 3 circles of different size and location. A gestalt is thus
determined by the specification of a few representatives
and the associated transformation group. Larger groups
correspond to more general gestalts, and inclusion relations
between groups can be translated into a gestalt hierarchy.




The larger the group, the less properties are left invariant
by all group elements. To quantify differences between
patterns or representatives belonging to a gestalt, we have
to introduce an additional structure, that of a norm13 of a
transformation, which measures the size of a transforma-
tion that is required to convert one pattern into another.
Because in general there are several ways to transform a
pattern to another, in a specific situation, we encounter the
optimization problem of finding a minimum norm trans-
formation between two given representatives of a gestalt.
An example from psychology of perception is the reaction
time required to identify a rotated pattern with a prototype.
It turns out that this reaction time is proportional to the
angle of rotation, the obvious norm of a rotation.
If such norms, that is, measures of the magnitude, or in
another interpretation perhaps also the cost of executing a
transformation, are given or obtained, we can also con-
struct a prototype for a gestalt, as a member of the gestalt
with the smallest average distance from the other members.
Again, the prototype need not occur as a specific pattern in
the available input, but it is a construction of the system on
the basis of general transformation rules utilized by it.
Even such a prototype need not be explicitly represented in
the system, but it is enough to have the implicit possibility
of making distance comparisons between members of a
gestalt. If now conversely the system is provided with a
specific input pattern, it can determine whether it belongs
to one of the gestalts constructed by it. For this, in prin-
ciple, there are two possibilities:
1. Transformation of the pattern by an element of the
group defining the pattern into a prototype that has
been constructed as described above. Here, the system
will try again to achieve this via a transformation of
smallest possible norm, in order to have at the same
time a criterion for how well the pattern matches to the
gestalt, in particular whether it is central or rather
marginal. It will be helpful to first submit the pattern to
a certain normalization to reduce the transformation
possibilities that need to be checked. Geometric
figures can for example be rescaled to a standard size,
they can be moved so that their center of gravity is in a
fixed position, etc.
2. Evaluation of the invariants characterizing the gestalt.
These are typically internal relations, such as pitch
differences between successive notes in a melody,
rhythmic relationships, relative position of the points
of a geometric figure to each other, or more abstract
quantities such as eigenvalues, etc. These invariants
could be obtained implicitly also by a kind of statistical
inference when the system learns similarity relations.
In practice, probably hybrids of these methods will be most
effective. Some results in this direction are known from
perceptual psychology experiments. For instance, Smith
and Minda (2002), subjects decide on the membership of a
visually presented pattern to a gestalt based on the simi-
larity to the prototype—which is only constructed within or
from the gestalt itself—rather than by comparison with the
concrete sample copies provided to the subjects. It would
be insightful to have further studies to determine to what
extent the investigation and evaluation of invariants is used
in perception as a criterion for gestalt membership.
By means of active transformation rules from (for
example, sensory) input patterns a gestalt is thus generated
that captures what is common to these patterns, what is
invariant. These rules are general and in particular inter-
subjectively valid; the individual generates them from the
interaction of genetic predispositions, cultural socialization
mechanisms, internal self-organization processes set in
motion by external impulses and individual learning pro-
cesses building upon that. The individuals obtain their
knowledge and thereby constitute themselves in the inter-
play between its endowments and its morphogenetic prin-
ciples on the one hand and the active sensorimotor
exchange with its environment and interactions with other
individuals that may get intensified by resonances on the
other hand.
This is particularly evident in learning the mother ton-
gue. The Chomskyan reference to the stimulus poverty,
that is, the underdetermination of linguistic structures by
the speech examples available during the child’s learning
process, has exposed a fundamental error of behaviorism,
which tried to explain the child’s learning of the mother
tongue by simple stimulus-response schemes. Chomsky
(1959) has probably eliminated behaviorism as a serious
theoretical approach. For learning language, one needs an
internal structure of the type of transformation rules of the
universal grammar of Chomsky (see Chomsky
1965, 1981, 1995 for the various stages of the development
of Chomsky’s theory) or something similar. Such a struc-
ture, however, could also, in combination with the other
components mentioned above, emerge in a self-organiza-
tion process and would only have to be implicitly repre-
sented in the system, as postulated by connectionism,
rather than being genetically fixed and (more or less)
explicitly (but not necessarily consciously) given, as
Chomsky thinks. But this is not yet decided, and perhaps
we need a conceptually deeper approach. We should not
13 ‘‘Norm’’, like ‘‘group’’, is understood here as a strictly defined
mathematical concept; therefore colloquial connotations lead the
understanding only astray. The norm of a transformation is a measure
of the difference from the so-called neutral or trivial transformation
that changes nothing, but leaves everything as it is. For a rigid
translation, the norm is given by the distance between the original
position and that caused by the translation. The norm of a rotation can
be measured by the rotation angle.
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forget that in expressions of everyday language, the
grammatical transformations are apparently so tightly
interwoven with semantic relationships and implicit refer-
ences to the context, which are understood by the listener
that automatic language interpretation and translation
programs for the present state of theoretical linguistics are
still out of reach,14 and also the connectionist models
quickly reach their limits. In particular, the linguistic
knowledge incorporates and integrates grammatical,
semantic and contextual components in a complex manner.
In Tomasello (2003), Tomasello argues against Chomsky’s
paradigm for a usage-based approach, emphasizing that
human children have more powerful learning mechanism at
their disposal than simple association and induction. They
can infer the intentions of other humans, and they possess
sophisticated skills of pattern finding. The ability of pattern
finding is, of course, one of the central themes of the
present essay.
Knowledge and cognition
So far, we have analyzed how knowledge is created and
comes about, and we have found that this process is not just
a passive data storage process but requires active use of
internally given structuring rules. The generality and uni-
versality of these rules then makes intersubjective com-
patibility of acquired and generated knowledge possible.
This knowledge then allows the subject to deal with new
experiences, by relating them to previous ones and thus
making them potentially meaningful. Knowledge as
memory allows us to compare the new with the already
known. Conversely, knowledge makes past experiences
currently available by capturing them in an internal
schema. In its knowledge, the subject knows statistical and
other regularities of the input world and in particular the
code that decodes or decyphers the information contained
in specific inputs.
Now there are different kinds of knowledge, and a more
detailed analysis provides insights into the process of cre-
ation and the structure of knowledge. Because, as argued,
knowledge is not just an unstructured storage of data, of so-
called ‘‘facts’’, but also in particular represents an organi-
zational principle, there follows directly a distinction
between factual knowledge or expertise on the one hand
and structural, storage or organizational knowledge on the
other. The internal structure rearranges the data and by its
internal classification leads to a higher efficiency and lower
storage costs, but then also requires knowledge of this
internal organizational structure itself. One no longer
remembers the data themselves, but where and how to find
them. In the knowledge organization we thus find the
transition from content to form. This is also related to the
transfer of the complexity from the direct relationship with
the outside world to the internal organizational structure
(see Jost 2004). This then leads to the formal consideration
of the question of the optimal knowledge representation.
If at this point already a short leap is permitted from
individual knowledge to cultural and social knowledge, we
see whole knowledge or scientific fields that focus for the
most part only on such structural knowledge, such as
jurisprudence or computer science. One does not learn the
civil law by heart, but rather the method to find the relevant
laws and legal judgments in a specific case. Similarly,
computer science is concerned with the general principles
of data organization and storage. For an analysis of how
every action, every concept and even every experience of
the individuals in a society depends on how the culture of
that society understands and structures knowledge, we refer
to Neuser (2013).
Another distinction that is important for cognition,
which is transverse to the above distinction, is that between
declarative and procedural knowledge, that is, the distinc-
tion between content and process knowledge, between the
‘‘what’’ and the ‘‘how’’. This is also the distinction between
explicit and implicit, tacit knowledge, between knowledge
which can be explicitly formulated and recalled in isola-
tion, and knowledge which is only implicit and is utilized
only in the flow of a process. In particular, knowledge is
not necessarily aware of itself.
Self-reassurance of knowledge
However, more is at stake. The process of knowledge
creation consists not only in the inclusion of inputs into an
organizational structure and the adaptation of this structure
to structures to be detected in the inputs—and the double
occurrence of the word ‘‘structure’’ already hints at a dif-
ficulty—but also in the revision of this structure according
to the experience of the outside world through the system.
Knowledge has no independent authority in itself by which
it can control itself, it need not even necessarily know
about itself, and it can gauge itself solely by its source,
which in the end is the outside world. On the basis of its
knowledge, the system can act purposefully, but this action
carries no guarantee of success in itself, but may fail.
Incorrect knowledge of the chairs in the room, the knee hit
in the dark. Plausible, but unfortunately too simplistic.
The system knows nothing of the outside world than just
its knowledge. Only through the artifice or sleight of hand
14 I had tried to use Google translate for translating my original
German text into English, but many sentences and phrases came out
completely garbled. In particular, such automatic translation schemes
which are based on n-grams, with n ¼ 5 typically, are not capable of
detecting long-range connections, as in German split verbs.
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that we postulate us as external observers of the system in
its environment, we can gain a concept of an independent
reality at all, but this is unavailable to the system itself. We
seem to fall, therefore, into a dilemma. From this per-
spective, the system has neither in itself nor outside of it a
controlling instance. The difficulties dissolve only when we
make a temporal differentiation and conceive at the same
time knowledge creation as a double feedback process.
Knowledge is not there, but is formed, and in this forma-
tion process the overwhelmingly large, in principle avail-
able data set is not completely stored, but on the basis of
the internal structure significant aspects will be singled out
selectively and have their compatibility with this structure
checked. This is the inner feedback loop. The outer loop
generates new data through action which is specifically
directed by the already existing and developed structures.
The above is the system theoretical trick of resolution of
a structure in a process, the emphasis on the preliminary
and unfinished. While this is important, and we will come
back to it, it evades the question raised here. There are
other approaches:
1. The reflection of knowledge about itself. While this is
not entirely possible, since the reflection on the
reflection on the reflection ...results in the well-known
endless recursion, and must therefore always omit
aspects about itself, but formally of course, a part of a
system can separate itself as an though imperfect
observer of the rest of the system. This self-reflection
of knowledge as formulated in the Socratic proposition
‘‘I know that I know nothing’’ can therefore be
considered as the beginning of Western philosophy.
Now this sentence is formulated negatively, but from
this insight fundamental issues of the possibility of
knowledge can then be analyzed. This leads into the
history of philosophy, but should not be further
illuminated here from the perspective of the history
of philosophy.
2. The realization that there are other, similar knowledge
carriers whose knowledge one can acquire. You
therefore no longer need to always take the trouble
to acquire one’s knowledge by oneself—the difficulties
of internal structuring of inputs as a basis of knowledge
have been pointed out above—but you can get
knowledge as already structured condensed experience
of others. This is not automatically possible, of course,
but requires first the ability to consider other knowl-
edge carriers not only as parts of the external world,
but to recognize them as systems that are of the same
kind as oneself. For humans, the prerequisite for this is
the ability of empathy, to be able to empathize with
others, in order to exploit how they deal with problems
with which one will also be confronted oneself.
Likewise, one can mitigate the unpredictability of the
others by assuming that they are similarly constituted
as oneself, with similar feelings and desires, and
therefore can also be expected to behave similarly as
one would do oneself. This is certainly not wrongly
emphasized in modern anthropology, in particular in
the work of Tomasello (1999). If this capability is
available, also internally compiled knowledge struc-
tures can be transmitted through communication. The
importance of communication is then obvious and
therefore need not be further elaborated here. Knowl-
edge becomes the knowledge of a community by
individuals preserving individual aspects of knowledge
and making them available as needed and also taking
care of their preservation and tradition. See for
instance the analysis in Neuser (2013).
3. The external storage of knowledge. This requires a
symbolic representation of knowledge and leads from
the invention of writing to the modern databases. The
knowledge of the outside world is thus stored back in
the outside world. Thus, the boundaries between the
data and their representation get blurred. The book
does not need to remain a representation of something
else, but can become a separate object of knowledge,
namely a more highly structured one than the object
area to which it refers. By the fact that the outside
world can now include representations about itself, it
will become at the same time more regular and more
complex for the epistemic system and thereby in turn
grants the system a growth in complexity.
Representations of knowledge
So far we have treated knowledge implicitly as individual
knowledge, as the knowledge of an individual. But by
items (2) and (3) of the preceding section, there is also
cultural, social, technical, ...knowledge that is available to
all members of a community and that is preserved as a
common tradition or stored in books, databases, .... We can
now understand this common knowledge not only as an
extension of individual knowledge, but also highlight dif-
ferent ways of structuring. A comparison should therefore
be illuminating.
Here we can distinguish three systematic issues, namely
those about
1. Storage: where is the knowledge?
2. Code: how is the knowledge represented?




These questions are obvious, and in many (but not all)
situations, the answers are just as obvious. The computer
science represents content traditionally in the code that is
simplest and therefore considered to be fundamental, the
binary one, and it stores data explicitly as a binary
sequences on the hard disk or other storage media and uses
concepts such as stack and queue for assembly and, for
example, hierarchical search trees for access. Some alter-
natives can be found in the various realizations of the
concept of the encyclopedia as an arrangement of all the
available knowledge and of a—more or less successful—
solution of the problem of specific search.15
• In Western antiquity, from the conception of Aristotle
of a systematic presentation of all available knowledge
in individual tracts a hierarchical organization emerges
as superimposing structuring principle which is devel-
oped in Hellenistic library catalogs.
• The ancient Chinese encyclopedias represent the most
extensive and most ambitious attempt ever undertaken
of systematic arrangements of the entire knowledge. It
involves a systematic organization of knowledge
available in one linear sequence immanently dictated
by the content, which, however, was partly based on
more extraneous combinatorial schemes rooted in
general cosmic ordering principles.16 Some of the
classification schemes in these encyclopedias appear
rather arbitrary and not necessarily appropriate for the
subject matter from the perspective of contemporary
science which is based on causal rather than systematic
principles. For example, the turtle is treated as a fish
because of its aquatic life.
• Incidentally, the Chinese encyclopedias do not contain
an index. Index and table of contents as a formal tool
for accessing specific knowledge from a source were
introduced by the schoolmen in Europe in the thirteenth
century.
• Associative knowledge networks: the related concepts
of Alsted, Kircher (see Kircher (1669)) and others
regain actuality, as emphasized by Breidbach (2005);
Breidbach (2007); Breidbach and Ghiselin (2006).
Here, too, of course, many details can be criticized as
in the Chinese encyclopedias. For example, the ideas of
Kircher for the deciphering of Egyptian hieroglyphics
nowadays seem abstruse, although they become under-
standable within his system. These knowledge
networks can also be seen in the tradition of mnemonic
systems (Yates 1966; Rossi 1983) which became
elaborate representations of an assumed structure of
the world. The Jesuit missionary Matteo Ricci was
inspired by such ideas to his ‘‘memory palace’’, a
method for memorizing the Chinese characters by
associatively linking them with visual imagery, by
positioning them in an imaginary spatial setting (for a
short description and other supplementary bibliographic
references see Spence 1984). Our memory cannot keep
unstructured data well, and the method of Ricci
represents an original approach to represent a largely
unstructured17 dataset by superimposing an internal
organizational principle that is extrinsic to the data.
• The internal logic of knowledge: deduction of knowl-
edge from a single principle: this is the approach of
Leibniz, which thus provides an explanation for the
coherence of the world and of knowledge. In particular,
this requires for Leibniz the replacement of associative
networks by a more rigorous formalism, which for him
is based on combinatorial rules.
• European encyclopedias as arrangement of knowledge
in individual articles in alphabetical sequence with a
system of cross-references. A systematic, associative or
logical arrangement is replaced by one based on a
convention (the Latin alphabet). As a search tree, the
latter allows to quickly find entries based on their
spelling; in a Chinese dictionary, this is much more
complicated and cumbersome. On this, the system of
cross-references is superposed that produces associative
links based on content relationships.
• Encyclopedias on CD-Roms: the actual ordering prin-
ciple is not disclosed to the user, who can acquire only
knowledge through cross-references (links). Anyway,
the electronic storage makes a hierarchical rather than a
linear organization of knowledge possible.
• Databases are limited to a fixed subject area and want
to develop the knowledge available for that field with
the help of interactive decentralized inputs. This results
in both the usual questions and problems of organiza-
tional structure (in particular fast access, efficient
storage, easy changeability of entries (updates)) and
automated data collection as well as those of the
15 These issues have been discussed in detail by Olaf Breidbach.
16 The systematic organizational structures of Chinese encyclopedias
have apparently not yet been systematically studied in the literature.
For an overview of the historical development see Schmidt-Glintzer
(1990), p. 308ff. The intellectual background of the encyclopedists is
represented in Needham (2017). For a satirical treatment, see Borges
et al. (1942).
17 I don’t intend to deny here that underlying the Chinese characters
there is a complex systematics that is based on both phonetic and
conceptual relations, which goes far beyond the pictorial element
which is usually naively considered as being the essential principle.




internal coherence of the various items. More problems
arise when one wants to link databases together,
because the respective organizational principles are
usually not readily compatible. One must therefore
create metastructures, in which the individual structures
can find their places.
• Computer networks: upon entering a search entry,
search engines systematically search Internet sites
according to a sophisticated mathematical search
procedure that utilizes superficial word similarities
and links between websites. The intention is to make all
existing (on the Internet) knowledge about the chosen
keyword available to the user. By a simple Google
search, an answer can be obtained on any issue, but the
quality of the proposed answers cannot be guaranteed.
The user does not usually have the resources to check
the facts claimed on the websites identified by the
search engine. This entails the risk that the independent,
critical and creative aspect of knowledge acquisition,
selection and production is lost. This risk must be
addressed through the development of new methods of
source criticism. We are also led back to the problem of
finding certainty of knowledge, now, however, no
longer as a problem of internal consistency and
coherence and the external reference of individual
knowledge, but also as a social challenge of informa-
tion selection and evaluation. It may seem that thus
another old problem, namely the availability and
acquisition of information for individuals is converted
into its opposite as information overload. According to
our analysis, this is only apparently so, because the
importance of information is only revealed in an
internally structured context, and the task to condense
meaningful knowledge from a flood of data cannot
simply be solved by increasing that flood of data. Only
meaningful prestructuring of these data might provide
help (without relieving the individual of its own
independent critical evaluation), but precisely here lies
the difficulty.
All featured encyclopedic concepts show in one way or
another a predominance of the systematically ordering over
the logical or causally analyzing thinking, and they also
each reflect the intellectual trends of the eras that created
them, and perhaps in turn contributed to shaping those
trends.
But how does this compilation of different methods to
represent knowledge and make it available as systemati-
cally and completely as possible help us? All these meth-
ods have their shortcomings. The problem appears to lie in
the explicit form of storage. Our brain does not work like
an encyclopedia or a database nor like the Internet. So far,
the human head is smarter than all of its products. But how
then does it represent this knowledge? And to what extent
can we speak here of ‘‘representation’’?18
Certainly, to move forward, we need to turn away from
the idea of a simple facts memory. A genome contains
knowledge about the environment, but not as retrievable
facts, but as a guide for the production of proteins—and at
the same time as a guide for the manufacturing process
itself—that form cellular structures and processes, which in
turn constitute an organism that has a chance to compete in
its environment and replicate. The storage as such is indeed
explicit, as a chain of molecular building blocks, the
nucleotides, but there is no direct reference to any envi-
ronmental data, for example, the temperature of the habitat
or the possible food sources. The genome encodes only the
development scheme for an organism, a structure that can
carry out its metabolic processes in its habitat, or, in
another perspective, it contains those structuring rules that
can maintain an autopoietic process with the ingredients
available from the environment. The genome however
knows nothing about that. Neither does the organism (see
Jost 2017a for further discussion of this issue).
However, this leads us to an important aspect, namely
that of the complementarity of knowledge.
The organism does not need to know, for example, that a
certain plant contains important nutrients for it. It just
needs to feel the hunger to eat this plant, and to know
where to find such a plant. And if this plant grows
throughout its habitat, it does not even need to know that.
The organism therefore does not need to know the struc-
tural regularities of the environment, but only needs to
know how to exploit them, if knowledge is required at all
for that. It does not need to know the obvious, the auto-
matically given, and it cannot know what is accidental or
totally irregular (although from the standpoint of cognition,
causality is reversed here, because it is precisely what a
system does not know and does not understand which is
randomly and arbitrary for it). Its knowledge operates
between these extremes. Now we no longer have two
components, but three, namely environment, genome and
organism. From the perspective that has been implicitly
selected here, the environment does not know anything, but
has only certain imperfect regularities. These regularities
are a prerequisite for the existence of the genome. The
genome has just been selected because, on the basis of
these regularities and possibly also by favorable accidents
that have enabled it to exploit further regularities, it has
been able to spawn organisms that have been able to dis-
cover more regularities. The genome has thus learned these
regularities in the course of its evolution; for the organism,
they are then simply given, and it just needs to know how
to exploit them. Again, and this is an important point for
18 See the discussion in Ziemke and Breidbach (1996).
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our purposes, knowledge requires an internal structure,
which condenses experiences acquired on a different time
scale and makes them expectable as regularities. The latter
are nowhere represented, but their presence makes their
representation unnecessary. This is the complementarity of
knowledge.
So what is there between these two extreme poles, the
encyclopedia, in which all the knowledge available is
stored in a form that enables an explicit, direct access, and
the genome, in which only production rules are encoded for
the ingredients for building and maintaining an internal
process which then can achieve its own replication, i.e.,
between—at least in intention—a complete representation
and the absence of the need for any representation?
It may seem helpful at this point to return to the dis-
tinction between explicit and implicit knowledge. Instead,
we now want to blur this distinction. For that purpose, we
consider the so-called connectionist approach of cognition
research. Its basic model is the neural network, a dynamical
system whose internal attractors represent the response
capabilities of the system to external inputs. The input is in
this case the initial condition for a dynamical iteration,
which evolves over time from a transition phase into an
invariant stable inner activity sequence. ‘‘Invariant’’ means
here that this sequence is repeated periodically. In the
simplest case it is a fixed point, that is, the dynamics comes
completely to rest at a certain intrinsic value. Another
possibility is a periodic orbit, which is always traversed in
the same way. However, there may also exist chaotic
attractors, which while compressing the dynamics, still can
internally diverge. ‘‘Stable’’ means here that the system
returns to the same attractor after a not too large pertur-
bation. A dynamical system typically has many and dif-
ferent attractors, and which is realized depends on the
initial conditions. In this sense, therefore, the attractors
classify the initial conditions, that is, in the situation under
consideration the inputs.19 Each attractor has its own basin
of attraction, and when an input in falls into this range, the
dynamics will approach the corresponding attractor. In this
manner, an input classification is possible, in which similar
inputs typically lead to the same attractor, while more
distinct one can run towards different attractors. Now,
however, the attractors in a way are only virtual states,
because they will only be realized if the appropriate input
comes. They represent the dynamical possibilities of the
system. The system of attractors of a dynamical system is
determined by the system parameters, in particular through
the coupling strengths between its various elements or
parts. This coupling strengths or other system parameters
are usually concretely physically realized. In a neural
network, these are the strengths of synaptic connections
between individual neurons. A particular such parameters,
however, cannot be assigned to a single attractor, but exerts
an influence on the dynamical capabilities of the system as
a whole. This structure of possible dynamical time courses
can be influenced by varying those parameters. If one
wants to make a particular input to run into a given
attractor, one has to adjust the system parameters accord-
ingly. If this is done systematically, one speaks in this
context of learning.20 But then, learning is a global and
distributed process in the system, even if the correspon-
dence between inputs and attractors to be produced is local
and concrete. On the one hand, many parameters have to be
adjusted, if perhaps only slightly, and on the other hand,
the adjustment of each parameter has an impact on the
whole dynamics, and thus also on the dynamics set in
motion by other inputs. Thus, the system represents its
input classes on one hand virtually through its dynamical
capabilities, on the other hand in a distributed manner in
real physical parameters that simultaneously reflect the
influences of all input classes.
Neuronal and cultural knowledge
In the preceding section, we have also seen an interaction
between different structures that contain, represent, or
process knowledge. In his monograph (Breidbach 2013),
Olaf Breidbach has analyzed the interaction between the
brain and the culture, and he has coined the term of
‘‘neuronal aesthetics’’. Here, ‘‘aesthetics’’ does not refer to
the concept of beauty, but more generally to its origin in
the Greek word
to sense.
Both the neuronal and the cultural system constitute a
dynamic web of relations within which facts acquire their
meaning and relevance and for which external stimuli
come about as perturbations of their internal dynamics. In
either system, the external world does not enter as a direct
representation, but is only indirectly constructed from the
internal perspective that records and evaluates those per-
turbations. External stimuli have the effect of making the
internal dynamics more specific. They canalize the
dynamics so that it gets into a position to explore more
specific options, and it is precisely this what leads to the
evolution of such systems. As explained above, the inter-
play of external stimuli and internal structures and
dynamics can reduce complexity and thereby enable the
19 For the construction of the classification system see also the above
remarks on the gestalt concept.
20 This is dealt with in the already mentioned statistical learning
theory and the theory of neural networks, see e.g., Jost (2017b).
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system, be it a neuronal or a cultural one, to acquire new
forms of complexity. Here, as in biological evolution, each
system is constrained by its own structure, but in turn, this
structure can also canalize the system towards new evo-
lutionary possibilities (see the discussion in Jost 2017c).
The interaction of these systems offers evolutionary
potential in both directions. In one direction, cultural tra-
ditions obviously provide knowledge for individuals and
shape cognition their cognition and thereby offer a poten-
tial for accumulation that cannot be achieved by individ-
uals without communication. In the other direction, beyond
the trivial fact that culture emerges from interactions
between individuals, externalization of cognitive tech-
niques, as we saw in the preceding section, triggers cultural
dynamics. The interaction opens each system for new
evolutionary possibilities. Either type of system can benefit
from complexity gains of the other.
In order to understand knowledge, we therefore need to
analyze the interaction and the relations, or in mathemati-
cal terminology the morphisms (see Jost 2015a), between
these two webs of relations. They are not isomorphic, and
they have developed different schemes of codings, they
operate on different time scales, they are rigid or flexible in
different ways, but they can relate to each other and
interact. In fact, much of their structure and dynamics is
derived from and dependent upon their interaction. Olaf
Breidbach had hoped to develop a morpho-logic to capture
these morphisms between experience and physiology
without the pitfall of trying to reduce one to the other, in
order to gain deeper insight into both of them. This is his
program of a neuronal aesthetics.
Knowledge and process
In this last section, we summarize some of our insights in
an abstract manner and provide an outlook that links our
analysis to recent technological advances and prospects.
Knowledge is by its nature something static and thus
cannot be directly conceived as a process, but only as a
result or a condensate of a process. Conversely knowledge
structures cognitive processes. This interplay can be only
captured in the interaction of two different time scales, a
slow one, on which the knowledge is acquired, learned,
produced and arranged, and thereby changed, and a fast
one, on which it is used structurally to process, organize,
evaluate and also systematically generate incoming data
and signals. In this perspective, the Shannon information
theory operates on the fast, the statistical learning theory on
the slow time scale. Thus, we do not have here competing
theories, but ones that can complement and support each
other. To make this fruitful, an integration of the two time
scales is required. This then also resolves the confrontation,
an essentially static perspective, of structure and process,
and transforms it into a dynamic interaction. That some-
thing like that is required is already shown by the simple
consideration that on the fast time scale, the system
parameters that incorporate the knowledge of the system
are fixed and the input, for instance, the sensory signals,
changes while on the slow scale the system parameters are
adapted, hence changed, whereas the signal distributions,
or more generally, the regularities underlying the input, in
contrast are assumed to be fixed. In fact, these regularities
show up only on the slow scale because only by the
observation of many data, on the one hand random fluc-
tuations average out and on the other hand more complex
laws can be detected.
Thus, as shown in the above analysis, we have the
mutually coupled processes of knowledge acquisition and
knowledge structuring. In some situations, these processes
can be implemented and controlled on purpose, such as
when building a database. Deeper insights can be probably
obtained from processes in which the structure emerges
from a collective, distributed dynamics of mutually cou-
pled but still partially independent units, i.e., by a so-called
self-organization process. In particular, the artificial neural
networks already mentioned have been introduced to
implement this. The central idea of this theory is that
synaptic connections between the individual elements, the
(formal) neurons, get strengthened according to the corre-
lation between the activities of the two neurons involved.21
However, this leads to the problem that those synapses then
continue to strengthen, and one has to compensate for this
effect by a forgetting mechanism. A mechanism that is
theoretically elegant (Gerstner et al. 1996) and well sup-
ported in neurobiological experiments (Markram et al.
1997) is the so-called spike-time-dependent synaptic plas-
ticity that depends on the temporal relationships between
the dynamics of the neurons involved (this is also com-
patible with the original formulation of Hebb’s rule). Here
in analogy to brain cells, the formal neurons sum the
incoming excitations received by them via synapses from
other neurons, until a firing threshold is reached, and then
produce an excitation pulse that is propagated to other
neurons via synaptic connections again. These synapses are
directed, that is, let excitations through in one direction
only, and one can therefore distinguish the presynaptic and
postsynaptic neuron in each constellation. The mentioned
learning rule now increases the strength of the synapse
when the presynaptic neuron fires shortly before the post-
synaptic one, that is, when the incoming excitation
21 This is the Hebbian theory, named after Hebb (1949). Hebb
himself traced this rule, however, back to Sigmund Freud. But this is
still not the original source, since this rule had been formulated within
a conception of an associative network already by Simon Exner in
1894 (Exner (1999)), see Breidbach (2001).
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contributes to activating the postsynaptic neuron. On the
other hand, the synapse is weakened if the temporal order
is reversed (see Jost 2006 for a mathematical model).
By means of such learning rules associative networks
can be built that can associate an input to a stored pattern.
In the above-mentioned context of dynamical systems,
each input class can be translated into a specific dynamical
activity, which then just represents the stored pattern to
which the input belongs. By a stored pattern, one would
initially mean something imposed from the outside, but
more interesting are internally evolving and emerging
patterns. Now through the operation of the relevant learn-
ing rules, when exposed systematic inputs actually internal
attractors develop in the network, which then classify the
inputs and thus assign them to internally constructed rep-
resentations. However, the question is how far this
approach really carries, in particular, whether through such
a simple, purely local learning rules also higher structures,
such as the gestalts discussed above can emerge. Perhaps it
is more likely that such association rules can be useful only
within a process that is set in motion and maintained by
more general structural principles.
The application of neural networks has recently seen
dramatic advances, by creating so-called deep neural net-
works, that is, networks, that like the mammalian neocor-
tex, contain several layers. In fact, instead of only six
layers, as we possess them, these networks often derive
their performance from hundreds of layers. Perhaps the
need for so many layers indicates that those deep neural
networks capture one important aspect of how the mam-
malian, and in particular, the human brain functions, but
other key aspects probably still elude them. Better under-
standing those principles of brain function should be
expected to lead to further dramatic improvements of the
performance of artificial neural networks.
In machine learning, a somewhat different approach is
pursued. One starts with certain structural priors to handle
high dimensional data sets. For instance, in compressed
sensing (Cande`s et al. 2006; Donoho 2006), one assumes
that there only exist few sources that have produced those
high dimensional data. In manifold learning (Belkin and
Niyogi 2003), one assumes that the data sit on or near an
intrinsically low dimensional smooth manifold, which may
then possibly stretch in a complicated manner into the high
dimensional data space. Or one assumes that the data are
intrinsically sums, with only a few terms, of products of
low dimensional vectors (Hackbusch 2012). A question is
whether these approaches can be subsumed under more
general principles, in light of the preceding considerations.
This is further discussed in Jost (2016, 2015b).
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